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Abstract 
Sharing similar colonial and post-independence civil war experiences, Mozambique and Angola’s 
development paths are often contrasted, with foreign aid-dependent Mozambique hailed a success 
compared to oil rentier Angola. This paper questions the so-called Mozambican miracle and 
contrasts it with Angola’s trajectory over the past two decades. Paying attention to the political 
trajectory of the ruling parties as well as the different timing and conditions linked to the post-war 
political economy transition, we discuss differences and similarities in the post-conflict 
reconstruction trajectory, policy space, and relative institutional fragility. We suggest that large 
aid flows to Mozambique have contributed to a relaxation of its government’s urgency in creating 
the financial structure capable of capturing rents from natural resources in contrast to Angola, 
while the relative absence of official development aid has led Angolan elites to seek tenure 
prolongation partly through high rent capture and incipient socialization of massive oil rents. We 
conclude by discussing the likely consequences of these factors in terms of the relative ‘fragility’ 
and ‘robustness’ of both states, and discuss implications for foreign assistance. 
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1 Introduction 
Mozambique has been hailed for many years as one of the most successful cases of post-war 
reconstruction. Following a peace agreement in 1992 that ended a fifteen-year long civil war 
between the Frelimo government and rebel movement Renamo, Mozambique remained 
politically stable for two decades and experienced one of the highest non-oil growth rates in 
sub-Saharan Africa (Nucifora and Pereira da Silva 2011). Pursuing structural adjustments and 
prioritizing ‘sound’ macroeconomic policies, the Mozambican government maintained the 
continuous support of a large number of foreign donors investing in multiparty democracy, 
‘good governance’, decentralization, and public service delivery. Long aid-dependent, 
Mozambique has seen in recent years a major growth in extractive sectors that could 
transform its political economy, yet uncertainties remain with regard to the development of 
some of these projects and the effective capture of resource rents by the Mozambican state. 
Despite historical similarities as a former Portuguese colony having experienced a traumatic 
post-independence civil war, Angola stands in sharp contrast in most of the literature. Peace 
agreements signed in 1991 and 1994 between the MPLA government and rebel movement 
UNITA collapsed, with hostilities only ending with UNITA’s military defeat in 2002. Fuelled 
by fast-rising oil revenues over the past decade, Angola’s developmental path is often 
described as highly inequitable and vulnerable to oil price volatilities and finite reserves. 
If uncritical approaches often portray Mozambique as an ‘aid-driven success story’, Angola is 
frequently presented as an archetypical case of ‘resource-cursed state’. A resulting 
assumption is that Mozambique could be considered a ‘robust’ state, while Angola would be 
expected to be a ‘fragile’ one. 
This paper draws on emerging theory and empirical data to question these characterizations. 
Our compared re-examination of the fiscal basis of the state and the manner in which tenure 
prolongation is secured by the ruling parties in each political system leads us to qualify the 
Mozambican success story in the light of impressive fiscal and managerial achievements in 
Angola. In both cases, though differently, non-tax revenues have underpinned the 
strengthening of the ruling party at the expense of democratic consolidation. Using an 
analytical framework that evaluates state fragility in terms of durability, legitimacy and 
efficiency (see Stewart and Brown 2009), we find important differences in efforts to translate 
non-tax revenue into developmental outcomes, with possible implications for the relative 
fragility of these two states. 
By contrasting new evidence and debates about the impact of resource rents and foreign aid 
on state-building and on the prospects for broad-based growth in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) 
with a historical reconstruction of the Angolan and Mozambican political and economic 
trajectories, we infer possible causal pathways between foreign aid and state fragility, on the 
assumption that Angola’s resource wealth negatively affected the intensity, duration and 
composition of foreign aid.  
1.1 Methodology 
Our analysis of the state-building trajectory in Angola and Mozambique is formulated as 
case-based paired comparison using a most-similar systems design (MSSD) (Tarrow 2010). 
Mozambique and Angola are good candidates for MSSD, in virtue of the many 
commonalities in their colonial history, socioeconomic make-up and political system. In both 
countries, Marxist-Leninist parties controlled the state after independence and faced 
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externally-supported armed opposition yet remained in power and abandoned socialism, 
transitioning at least nominally to multiparty democracy with both historical opposition 
parties remaining marginal. Our analysis attempts to isolate a key variable that is expressed 
differently in these two cases, the source of funding underpinning the post-conflict 
reconstruction and state-building processes. In the case of Mozambique there has been a 
historical reliance on the financial assistance provided by foreign donors which over the last 
two decades has been the main contribution to state revenue and social expenditure. By 
contrast, for reasons explained below, foreign assistance remained significantly lower in 
Angola with much of the functioning of the state and social provision relying on revenues 
stemming from the oil sector. Important observations about the long-term effects for state-
building in (SSA) can emerge from the comparison with Angola, one of the few countries in 
the region that has not been through a structural adjustment programme (Soares de Oliveira 
2007a). Our analysis links the implications of the reliance on foreign aid or on natural 
resource rents on the emerging fiscal architecture, the political settlement and the policy 
space in each case. We hypothesize that the different sources of funding will lead to different 
outcomes in terms of the three dimensions of state fragility: durability, legitimacy and 
effectiveness.1 
To further test the robustness of our comparison, we conduct a series of ‘before-and-after’ 
analyses of the same cases, as suggested by George and Bennett (2005). We study two 
specific series of exogenous events to evaluate and compare foreign aid relationships with 
state fragility, both in terms of what these shocks revealed about aid’s contribution to state 
robustness (or lack thereof), and reactions in the state-donor relations to the shock. The first 
such case is the end of the cold war and subsequent peace agreements (Rome agreement of 
1992 for Mozambique; Bicesse accords of 1991 for Angola) and the second is the series of 
crises between 2007-09 (food crisis, commodity price collapse, and Arab Spring).  
1.2 Structure of the paper 
Following this introduction, the second section of this paper provides a brief theoretical 
discussion of the literature contrasting the effects of foreign aid and resource rent on state 
institutions, and briefly presents indicators for the three main dimensions of state fragility 
evaluated here. 
The third section traces the most relevant aspects of the aid and rents trajectories in both 
polities. In the case of Angola we ascertain the reasons for the weak engagement of foreign 
donors in the post-conflict reconstruction and trace the way in which this related to resource-
based funding opportunities for the Angolan state. In the case of Mozambique we trace the 
economic trajectory of the post-conflict decades, reconstruct the formation of an aid-
dependent political settlement and the determinants of the very low taxation rate. The section 
closes by examining the way in which different sources of revenue may have shaped the 
party system and the state.  
In the fourth section we expand on the comparison of the two systems and propose some 
analytical implications. Of particular interest is the seeming transition currently taking place 
                                                
1 However, we consider that resource or aid dependence are not exogenous but contingent upon a variety of 
factors discussed in this paper. In other words, it is not only the presence of geological deposits that determines 
resource dependence, or merely the presence of a large number of donors in a ‘resource poor’ country that 
results in aid dependence and compliance towards donor policies. 
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in Mozambique away from aid dependency and increasingly around the management of its 
more recently discovered gas and mineral endowments. The comparative examination of the 
fiscal regime in the extractive sector already reveals important differences between Angola 
and Mozambique, but perhaps this development also signals some margin for future 
convergence.  
We conclude by discussing the likely consequences of these factors in terms of the relative 
‘fragility’ and ‘robustness’ of both states and suggesting implications for foreign assistance. 
2 Foreign aid, resource rents and state institutions 
Debt cancellations and rising commodity prices at the beginning of the new millennium 
revived interest about the rentier state theories and the negative effects of aid dependence. 
Most of the studies then concluded that while both forms of ‘unearned’ income could 
undermine the consolidation of state institutions, aid and rents varied greatly in their effects, 
largely as a result of distinctive allocation processes. Therkildsen (2002) and Collier (2006: 
1485) draw attention to these comparative developmental impacts, noting that while both 
reduced the need for taxation, at least in the case of aid there existed ‘donor-imposed 
mechanisms of scrutiny’ that substituted for the reduced pressure from citizens. If aid 
dependence entails the risk, postulated by Brautigam and Knack (2004), of governments 
being more accountable to donors than to their own citizens, access to vast resource rents run 
the risk of sustaining governments accountable to no one, with ‘citizens-as-taxpayers’ and 
donors being made irrelevant (el-Beblawi and Luciani 1987; Le Billon 2005; Ross 2001). 
In light of this debate, Moore (2004) advocates for greater reliance on domestic taxpayers as 
the main mechanism to finance the state in order to promote a fiscal (social) contract 
between the state and the population, with supposed positive effects on state durability, 
legitimacy and effectiveness. However, Moore cautions against simplistically expecting that 
the ‘quality of governance in contemporary developing countries might improve if states 
were more dependent for their financial resources on domestic taxpayers’. In a similar vein 
Di John (2011) claims that as the main mechanism binding the state, interest groups and other 
citizens, the level and quality of taxation reflect the ascendancy of the state over the polity 
providing a direct and objective indicator of state capacity, but advocates for an approach to 
tax policy that goes beyond increasing the tax revenue and calls for stressing the impacts of 
its implementation (a pro-growth rather than a pro-revenue approach).  
Testing the association between net official development aid (ODA) and domestic tax 
revenues, Benedek et al. (2012: 1) confirm this crowding-out effect of aid, yet qualify it: as 
major donors start pushing for domestic revenue mobilization, the effect progressively 
weakens. The authors also note ODA grants produce such crowding-out effect but not loans. 
They conclude by noting that aid does have ‘a particularly strong negative effect on domestic 
tax revenues in low-income countries and in countries with relatively weak institutions’. 
Overall, this literature points at the mutual influence of revenue sources and institutional 
quality. While the relative importance of ‘unearned incomes’ tends to negatively affect the 
quality of institutions, and thereby aggravate the relative fragility of states, these effects vary 
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according to the type of revenues, most notably foreign aid (or ‘strategic rents’) and resource 
rents.2  
2.1 State fragility and the nature of rents 
State ‘fragility’ is a broad term that emerged from development and security studies to 
denominate a situation characterized by dysfunctional, deteriorating or collapsed central 
authorities. The term is generally associated with concepts of ‘weak’ or ‘failed’ states, yet––
as many have observed––conveys more a sense of vulnerability to potential shocks than one 
of existing crisis.3 Such vulnerability, in turn, results in part from ‘weak institutional 
capacity, poor governance, and political instability’, the defining characteristics of ‘fragile 
states’ for the World Bank.4 For the purpose of this paper we build on distinctions made 
between state fragility related to durability and authority, as the relative length of political 
leadership (given institutional expectations such as limits on political tenure terms) and reach 
of state control over its citizens, resources, and territory; legitimacy, as democratic 
accountability (or the broader ideological adhesion from the population); and effectiveness of 
state institutions in terms of developmental outcomes (see Carment, Sammy and Landry 
2013; Stewart and Brown 2009). 
When state fragility is evaluated in terms of the durability dimension, the literature shows aid 
and oil rents both as positive robustness factors. By contrast the authority dimension suggests 
that if both aid and oil can help, aid tends to reinforce the politico-legal independence of the 
state while reducing its policy autonomy (Brown 2013), while high oil rents tend to reinforce 
the policy autonomy of the ‘petro-state’, yet would reduce incentives for the state to establish 
dense connections with its population for lack of need of broad taxation (Karl 1997). Despite 
well-established links between oil dependence and armed conflicts (Colgan 2011; Lujala et 
al. 2007; Ross and Andersen 2012), and suggestions that negative aid shocks increase armed 
conflict events (Findley et al. 2011; Nielsen et al. 2011), there is mounting evidence that non-
tax revenues contribute to regime durability. The lower taxation burden on the elites and 
greater social spending are postulated as causal mechanisms.5 Wright et al. (2013) observe 
that ‘greater oil wealth promotes autocratic survival by lowering their risk of ouster by a rival 
autocrat, not by reducing the likelihood of democratic transition’, while Ahmed (2012) 
                                                
2  This paper does not cover other types of rents such as overseas remittances, which appear to lead to the 
deterioration of institutional quality (Abdih et al. 2012). Remittance estimates vary greatly. IFAD estimates that 
in 2006 Mozambique received an estimated US$565 million or 7.4 per cent of GDP, while Angola received 
US$969 million or 2.2 per cent of GDP, compared to a regional average for Africa of 5 per cent of GDP. See 
www.ifad.org/remittances/maps/africa.htm. The World Bank estimates an annual average between 2008 and 
2011 of US$25 million for Angola (with an outflow of US$666 million) and US$129 million for Mozambique 
(with an outflow of US$57 million, and an inflow of US$80 million for 2006). See 
www.//go.worldbank.org/092X1CHHD0/. 
3 The crisis states project at LSE distinguishes between fragile, crisis and failed states: see 
www2.lse.ac.uk/internationalDevelopment/research/crisisStates/download/drc/FailedState.pdf  
4  The World Bank’s definition of fragile states covers low-income countries scoring 3.2 and below on the 
Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA), which is used to assess the quality of country policies and 
the main input to IDA’s Performance-Based Allocation (PBA) system. This involves around thirty countries. 
Countries scoring >3.2 on the CPIA may manifest symptoms of fragility in specific sectors or even in sub-
national areas.  
5  Although these operate differently in democracies and autocracies.  
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concludes that ‘governments in autocracies use aid ... inflows to reduce their expenditures on 
welfare goods to fund patronage’. Overall, recent studies all find evidence of positive 
association between higher non-tax revenues and greater regime or political leadership 
durability (Morrison, 2009; Omgba 2009: 420; Cuaresma et al. 2011; Ahmed 2012; Andersen 
and Aslaksen 2012).  
If state fragility is thought of in terms of legitimacy, including the level of democratization, 
the literature indicates that under certain circumstances oil rents can qualify as a factor of 
fragility, and foreign aid as a factor of robustness. Ross and Andersen (2012: 1) conclude that 
oil wealth becomes a hindrance to democratic transitions if rents are captured by authoritarian 
factions, while Dunning (2008) finds instances of increasing oil rents promoting 
democratization in contexts of high inequality if rents are used to mitigate popular grievances 
if wealthy elites do not consider that their position is undermined. In relation to the effect of 
foreign aid, Dunning (2004) and Bermeo (2013) find a negative impact of aid on 
democratization during the cold war, notably through donor support for right-wing autocrats, 
yet find a positive impact after the post-cold war, probably as a result of the contemporary 
emphasis on democratization and the good-governance agenda. Wright (2009) further notes, 
that regime responses to aid conditionality linked to democratic reform receive different 
responses, depending on the political regime, with ruling parties more likely to accept this 
type of conditionality in the absence of strong opposition.  
Lastly, non-tax revenues seem to affect negatively the quality and effectiveness of 
institutions, and thereby developmental outcomes. Several studies suggest that both foreign 
aid and oil rents undermine the quality of political institutions, aid even having a larger effect 
than oil (Djankov et al. 2008). Brautigam and Knack (2004) observe that the quality of 
governance and tax revenue share of GDP both decline with higher levels of aid. Girod 
(2012) qualifies this finding in terms of development outcomes by finding that aid inflows 
can have a positive developmental impact in ‘post-conflict’ contexts provided that the 
recipient government is of low strategic importance to donors and lacks access to high 
resource rent; such context creating strong incentives for recipient governments to pursue the 
development goals articulated by donors in order to secure much needed aid flows. In 
contrast, aid provided to strategically important governments with access to high resource 
rents does not improve developmental outcomes. 
The resource curse argument suggests that resource wealth negatively affects the quality of 
institutions through authoritarianism, resistance to reforms, and greater corruption, thus 
resulting in ‘weaker states’ (Stevens and Dietsche 2008). If there is much evidence to support 
the view that resource wealth has deleterious effects on the quality of institutions relative to 
those of states at similar income levels (Fearon 2005), many studies also demonstrate that 
resource-rich regimes are comparatively more durable (Smith 2004), a paradox best 
expressed by Ricardo Soares de Oliveira’s (2007b) concept of ‘successful failed state’. A 
recent study accounting for the endogenous effects of oil wealth on economic development 
finds a significant and positive relation between measures of public goods provisions and oil 
rents; suggesting that while ‘countries with greater oil supplies may be more corrupt and have 
worse governance than expected for their level of wealth … oil also provides the necessary 
funding to establish better governance’ and delivers public goods (Kennedy and Tiede 
2013: 8). Such question of resource-related state fragility needs also to be approached 
historically, notably in the case of oil (Le Billon 2012; Ross 2012). The 1970s––with much 
greater oil fiscal earnings from oil nationalizations, contract renegotiations, and booming oil 
prices–– marked a transition point, after which oil windfalls brought greater financial strength 
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but also new forms of weakness, as fast-growing bureaucracies with still limited absorptive 
capacities faced new or increased expectations from the population and ruling elites. With the 
collapse of oil prices in the early 1980s, states became doubly weakened. Financially, petro-
states faced massive indebtedness, a debt overhang that resulted in part from the over-
optimism and fast growth of the boom period. Bureaucratically, petro-states faced new 
challenges of underfunding and accompanying structural adjustments. Debt, low prices, and a 
neoliberal agenda of privatization further moved the balance of power in favour of foreign 
investors and new civil society organizations. This historical pattern does not apply to all oil 
producers, but the initial phases of oil windfall occurring in the midst of poor countries with 
low absorptive capacity are applicable to many, with some caveats in the case of Angola, as 
discussed below. 
Table 1: Main arguments about aid, rents, and state fragility criteria 
Dimensions Foreign aid Resource rents 
Durability and authority Stable or increasing ODA inflows 
increase regime durability, but can 
reduce authority 
Rents increase regime durability 
and sovereign authority, 
especially of autocratic regimes 
  
Legitimacy Increases legitimacy as a result of 
emphasis on democratization and 
good governance 
Decreases legitimacy in the 
absence of broad redistribution 
 
Effectiveness Decreases effectiveness through 
lower tax revenue, unless donor 
goals are developmental and 
recipient countries do not benefit 
from alternative revenues 
Decreases effectiveness but 
only on a relative basis, with high 
rents still increasing state capacity 
and public goods provision 
Source: Compiled by the authors. 
2.2 Assessing ‘state fragility’ for Mozambique and Angola 
Several organizations present assessments of ‘fragility’ for Mozambique and Angola. 
Varying slightly in their methodology, all rank the Angolan state or ‘situation’ as more 
‘fragile’ than that of Mozambique, while our analysis stresses in contrast a potentially 
‘stronger’ Angolan state.6 This, we suggest, reflects an analysis based on socioeconomic 
indicators and perception surveys for individual dimensions (such as corruption) rather than 
case study analyses able to capture historical contingencies as well as the economic and 
political particularities and recent trajectories shaping individual states, as presented below. 
Both Angola and Mozambique have had very durable regimes, with continuous rule by the 
same political parties since independence despite civil wars and democratization processes. 
Both states, however, faced important challenges to their territorial authority, with rebel 
 
                                                
6  The Center for Systematic Peace classified Angola’s fragility as ‘high’ compared to ‘serious’ for 
Mozambique in 2010 (Marshall and Cole 2012). Foreign Policy’s Failed State Index gave a deteriorating 
ranking and score of 87 for Angola, but an improving ranking and score of 83 for Mozambique (Foreign Policy 
2013). The World Bank (2013) classifies Angola as being in a ‘fragile situation’, but not anymore than 
Mozambique. So does the OECD (2013), which stresses that nearly half of ‘fragile countries’ were now middle-
income countries, mostly as a result of high commodity prices. The Country Indicators for Foreign Policy notes 
that while Angola is regularly ranked among the 20 most fragile countries, Mozambique moved out of the top 
40 fragile countries as early as 1996 (Carment, Sammy and Landry 2013). 
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Box 1: Putting state fragility to the test 
Several events with global repercussions have tested the fragility of states in the past five years, including 
sharp food price rise in 2007-8, the economic downturn of 2008-9 and its depressing effect on commodity 
prices, and public protest diffusion effects of the Arab Spring in 2011-12. Despite their differing impacts on 
Angola and Mozambique, each constituted an extraneously driven test upon state fragility. We examine 
each in turn: 
Fuel and food crisis, 2007-08. There was no reported riot in Angola, in part because of fuel and food 
subsidies and a feared security apparatus, and this despite upcoming elections in September 2008 that 
could have seen the context manipulated for delegitimizing the regime. In contrast, Mozambique 
experienced some of the most severe protests on the continent, with at least five people killed and more 
than a hundred injured, many of them shot by the police (Berazneva and Lee 2013). Besides repression, 
the government responded by cutting down the price of diesel for minibuses and increasing the minimum 
wage as well as the Ministry of Agriculture’s budget with donor support, but a funding gap of half a billion 
dollars remained for the implementation of a medium term plan (Viatte et al. 2009). 
Commodity price collapse, 2008-09. The collapse of oil prices in the second half of 2008 resulted in a 
major fiscal crisis for the Angolan state, to which it initially responded by tightening fiscal and monetary 
policies before resorting to a US$1.4 billion IMF loan. The crisis was short, however, as prices recovered 
during 2009, though it served to push several reforms including greater fiscal transparency, the creation of 
a sovereign wealth fund (FSDEA), and a strengthening of tax administration – though these do not seem 
to challenge much the patronage system (e.g. President dos Santos’s son is one of the two FSDEA 
directors). A net fuel importer, Mozambique was positively affected by the commodity price collapse, while 
ODA remained constant in 2009, though diminishing thereafter, while the viability of some FDI projects, 
including major extractive ones were (briefly) questioned. 
Arab Spring, 2011-12. Besides Mali, the ‘Arab Spring’ generally had a limited impact in Sub-Saharan 
African countries. In Mozambique, the number of protests recorded by ACLED actually declined in 2011 
and 2012 compared to the previous two years. Yet in Angola, the demonstrations sharply increased in 
2011 and 2012 after having declined to very low levels in the previous decade.* Through 2011 and early 
2012, anti-government protests grew in size, though rarely gathering more than a thousand people. Pro-
government demonstrations, in contrast, dwindled in size, and the government resorted to pre-emptive 
violence against protest organizers through using proxy thugs. President dos Santos has also been 
admonished and jeered at by crowds during some public speeches in 2012, suggesting a growing (yet still 
limited) defiance of the established order. 
Note: * A call for a mass demonstration circulated through the internet in early 2011 drew 17 people, all of whom were 
arrested, including three journalists and their driver. Eager to demonstrate where ‘mass power’ resided, the MPLA had 
spent a reported US$20 million dollars to organize pre-emptive pro-dos Santos demonstrations, the one in Luanda 
gathering perhaps 100,000 people, though state media reported a million (de Morais 2012). 
Source: Compiled by the authors. 
 
factions controlling large areas for extended periods, including major towns in the case of 
UNITA. The Angolan state now appears to be in control of its entire territory, with some rare 
attacks by Cabinda separatist movement FLEC, while Mozambique is facing a renewed 
challenge on the part of Renamo.7 Both ruling parties, Frelimo and the MPLA, have been 
                                                
7  Several deadly attacks on police forces and civilians took place in Central Mozambique in the spring of 
2013, and an official RENAMO spokesperson declared that the movement would block the country’s main 
highway and a crucial rail link to coal fields (England 2013a). 
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legitimated by repeated victories in elections.8 Protests have generally been on the rise in 
both countries during recent years, with a greater number of them in Mozambique. None of 
these have escalated into sustained anti-government campaigns, however (see below).  
Perhaps more worrying is a large number of protests and lynching at community level in 
Mozambique, suggesting for Hanlon (2009) growing desperation among a frightened 
population in the midst of continuing poverty and hunger, a desperation so far resulting more 
from the absence of effective state than against the state itself. 
In terms of state effectiveness, Angola’s socioeconomic indicators are generally above those 
of Mozambique, but Mozambique saw more rapid progress than Angola over the past decade 
in most areas, including literacy rates, poverty reduction, and under-five mortality, but not in 
maternal mortality rate.9 In terms of governance indicators, Mozambique fares much better 
than Angola, with improvements in Angola between 2002 and 2008 being mostly the result 
of greater perceptions of political stability, and to a lesser extend of regulatory quality and 
rule of law, but not in corruption control and government effectiveness (Kaufmann et al. 
2013). Yet while indicators for Mozambique suggest some improvement in government 
effectiveness and control of corruption as well as regulatory quality (until 2009), political 
stability, rule of law as well as voice and accountability have declined since about 2005. 
Overall, both regimes have so far proven durable, with ruling parties being officially 
legitimated through regular elections, yet both states continue to lack effectiveness despite 
important progress made over the past decade or so in some important areas. Both states 
coped relatively well with a series of exogenous shocks, though there remain important 
domestic tensions and vulnerabilities, as discussed below. Trends in regime durability and 
state authority and legitimacy suggest that both ruling parties have consolidated their 
territorial presence, hold on security, and electoral legitimacy; but Mozambique remains 
challenged through renewed RENAMO armed contestation and protests, as does Angola to a 
more limited extent with UNITA and FLEC, and some protests by opposition forces. Trends 
in socioeconomic indicators could suggest that Mozambique’s ‘foreign aid-driven model’ has 
been more effective in addressing these socioeconomic issues than the ‘oil rent model’ 
followed by Angola, but not sufficiently given the very low baseline from which 
Mozambique started, and this despite an additional decade of ‘peace’ in the country 
compared to Angola. As discussed below, this possibility is backed in part by the priority put 
by the Angolan government on a trickle down model rather than pro-poor and redistributive 
model of development. Should that chosen model be effective (or a more mixed-model 
including greater redistribution and public service provision) and oil rents sustained, 
however, one could see an acceleration of progress on these issues in Angola. Trends in 
governance indicators could suggest that foreign aid may have helped to improve government 
effectiveness and reduce corruption, while resource rents may have allowed the Angolan state 
to consolidate its authority, but not to become more effective or less corrupt. 
                                                
8  Though to be treated with caution, only 16 per cent of Angolans surveyed ‘approve of the job performance 
of the leadership of this country’, compared to 66 per cent of Mozambicans, Angola ranking the third lowest 
among all countries surveyed (Gallup 2012). 
9 Though improving, there is a lack of socioeconomic indicators for Angola and to a lesser extent but more 
surprisingly (given the heavy presence of international development organizations) for Mozambique to assess 
state effectiveness, see World Bank’s WDI. 
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3 Trajectories of public finance in Angola and Mozambique  
Angola and Mozambique had different relations with donors and creditors starting from 
independence in 1975. Throughout the period and until the end of the Mozambican war in 
1992, ODA flows to both countries were growing year-on-year but Mozambique was better at 
attracting ODA. In 1992 Mozambique received US$1.4 billion compared to US$343 million 
for Angola. During the following decade and excluding debt-related operations, total ODA to 
Mozambique stabilized at around US$1 billion per annum, whereas ODA to Angola––at war 
until 2002––also stabilized but around a lower average of US$300 million. Since the end of 
the Angolan war the trajectories have further diverged, with ODA to Angola contracting to 
US$200 million or about US$10 per capita in 2011, while flows to Mozambique expanding 
rapidly to reach a peak of US$2 billion or US$87 per capita (OECD-DAC 2013).10  
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Figure 2: ODA as percentage of GNI, comparative 
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There are manifest differences not only in terms of the total magnitude of ODA but also in its 
composition. At a lower level, Angola receives a similar proportion from multilateral 
institutions and DAC donors; in Mozambique DAC donors’ contribution has far exceeded the 
disbursements by multilateral institutions. Furthermore, DAC-donors provided the basis of 
the expansion of ODA inflows to Mozambique in the last decade, but as the slight 2008-09 
                                                
10  Angola’s population is estimated at 19 million compared to Mozambique’s 23 million (UNSTATS 2010). 
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hiatus shows, the financial crisis in the western economies could compromise the 
sustainability of this level of transfers in the coming decade. In the past year, a number of 
donors have restructured their strategy in Mozambique and some are pulling out of budget 
support altogether.11 The impact of this financial contraction will be felt disproportionately in 
the Mozambican public sector, the main channel of aid delivery in Mozambique. Between 
2007 and 2011, 53 to 70 per cent of total ODA went to the public sector in Mozambique, and 
10-12 per cent to civil society and NGOs. In Angola the proportion channelled through the 
public sector and civil society has been roughly on par. In 2011 for example, civil society 
organizations received US$95 million against US$82 million allocated to the public sector. 
The differences extend to the modality of foreign aid: Mozambique pioneered a budget 
support programme that saw ODA represent 51.4 per cent of the general budget in 2010 and 
39.6 per cent in 2012 (ECDPM 2012), in 2010, 41 per cent of total ODA was allocated to 
budget support (OECD-DAC 2013). In contrast, budget support has been marginal in Angola, 
representing 3 per cent of total ODA in 2011 while in that same year 81 per cent of total 
ODA in Angola went to fund project interventions. With an ODA composition that has over 
the last decade emphasized budget support, Mozambican public revenue is disproportionately 
exposed to changes to aid inflows. A similar contraction in Angola would not affect the 
general budget.  
Mozambique’s public sector vulnerability to changes in aid inflows is also a consequence of 
the proportional contribution that these funds make to total public revenue. ODA has 
consistently represented around 20 per cent in GNI in Mozambique, whereas in Angola it 
represented less than 10 per cent of GNI before 2004 (see Figure 2). Since then, the growth of 
oil revenue has reduced aid’s contribution to about 1 per cent. Differences in this respect 
could be attributed to Angola having commercially exploited its oil deposits for a longer 
period than Mozambique its own gas and coal deposits. As will be shown below, the 
differences transcend the mere presence of natural endowments and are closely related to the 
political processes underpinning the design of fiscal regimes to capture and channel resource 
revenues into state income.  
But if Mozambique is vulnerable to fluctuations in aid disbursement, Angola is not less 
protected from changes in oil prices. The 2008 financial crisis caused an accelerated slump in 
global oil prices that exposed the extent of Angola’s dependence on the oil rents. After 
hovering around US$130 per barrel in July 2008, prices fell down to US$40 in December and 
would only recover by the end of 2009. The 2009 budget exercise had to be revised 
downward mid-way through the year to accommodate for the shortfall. Revenue from oil 
taxes in 2009 fell to US$14.6 billion, only two-thirds of the revenues obtained in 2007 
(Jensen and Paulo 2011). Before the crisis, oil-related revenue was estimated at around 80 per 
cent of total state revenue: in 2009 it fell to 59 per cent (Global Witness and OSISA 2011). 
As a consequence of the crisis the Angolan government fell behind in debt repayment, which 
it tried to compensate in part by accepting a Stand-by-Agreement with the IMF that resulted 
in a US$1.4 billion loan in 2009.  
                                                
11  During 2012 the contribution of most bilateral donors to Mozambique was reduced (OECD 2013b). The 
total amount received increased to US$1.264 billion in 2012, up from US$1.156 in 2011 on the back of 
multilateral institutions transfers. Among other, disbursements from USA, UK, Sweden, Portugal, Spain and the 
Netherlands decreased in relation to previous years (O Pais 2013b). According to the Ministry of Finance, 
despite committing to a support programme equivalent to 41.4 per cent of the 2012 budget, due to disbursement 
shortfalls on the part of donors, BSP amounted only to a 27 per cent of total execution (O Pais 2013a).  
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An important difference between Mozambique and Angola, however, is the greater degree of 
autonomy and manoeuvrability allowed by Angola’s sovereignty over the oil rent. Although 
Mozambique has stepped up the tax collection exercise by treasury and deployed other 
strategies to mitigate the foreseeable diminution of ODA, ODA remains an important 
component of state revenue over which the government has only limited control. Considering 
the larger size of the Angolan economy adds an additional layer to Angola’s government 
overall revenue, representing a larger proportion of GDP than that of Mozambique.  
3.1 Financing post-war reconstruction in Angola  
A brief historical reconstruction of post-war political economy in Angola and Mozambique 
helps elucidate the determinants of a considerable divergence. Angola was affected by a 
longer-lasting war with several failed attempts at resolution. During the conflict years the 
Angolan state had enormous difficulty finding external sources of finance. Desperate for 
funds to wage the war against UNITA, Angola negotiated access to commercial credit in a 
series of oil-collateralized loans with public and private creditors. Repayments were 
transferred directly by the trading agents selling oil on Angola’s behalf (Heller 2012; 
Nicholas Shaxson 2007b). By the end of the war in 2002, Angola had accumulated debt for 
some US$10 billion, US$2 billion of which was to Paris Club countries. As a result of this 
Angola could not obtain further lending (Brautigam 2011).  
In this context, the government and IMF resumed negotiations aimed at establishing a Staff-
Monitored Program (SMP) to ultimately allow Angola to find funding for reconstruction. But 
the negotiations stalled in 2003 because Angola was reluctant to commit to a policy package 
including macroeconomic stabilization through inflation-targeting; reduction of public 
expenditure and opening public finance and oil rent accounts to IMF scrutiny (Soares de 
Oliveira 2007a; Vines et al. 2009).12 
In 2003 Angola appealed for credit to China, by then one Angola’s main trading partners. 
The Chinese government approved the first of two oil-backed credit lines through the China 
Exim Bank totalling US$11 billion, giving rise to the so-called ‘Angola-model’ of loans 
backed with natural resources and earmarked for infrastructure and reconstruction projects. 
These credits are repaid at Libor + 1.5 per cent over 17 years with a five-year grace period 
and a 50 per cent grant element on the first two billion, in effect a quasi-concessional rate. 
Corkin (2011) puts this into perspective by noting that these credits are more expensive than 
non-concessional forms of ODA but far cheaper than similar war-time credits. In the 
following years Angola would receive loans reported to be worth US$4.3 billion from a 
private Chinese financial institution and in 2010 US$1 billion for agricultural development 
from the Chinese Development Bank. However, from 2007 onward Angola discontinued the 
use of oil guarantees. Chinese credit has materialized in some 120 projects with active 
monitoring and involvement of the Angolan state to ensure that the projects are successfully 
implemented. Scarce bureaucratic capacity has been mobilized to follow up on these projects 
because through them the government has gained domestic recognition, which it capitalizes 
for its political advantage (Vines and Weimer 2011a).  
                                                
12 The Angolan government did agree to an ‘oil diagnostic’ in 2000, but only published its executive summary 
in 2003 (Human Rights Watch 2004). 
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These alternative financial mechanisms relieved Angola from the urgency of an agreement 
with multilateral institutions and laid the foundations of a more distant relation with 
traditional donors. The first post-conflict years saw an increase in humanitarian assistance for 
the repatriation of refugees and the most pressing demining and infrastructure rehabilitation 
(Le Billon 2005). But after 2006, assistance started dwindling while shifting from 
humanitarian assistance to education, health and government expenditure. 
By far, the main component financing Angola’s reconstruction effort were tax and non-tax 
revenues stemming from the oil sector, with government oil revenues rising from US$1.5 
billion in 1992 to US$40 billion by 2012 as a result of new offshore oil fields and rising oil 
prices. The mobilization of these resources was made possible by a consistent and fairly 
unique state strategy vis-à-vis the management of the oil sector. Immediately after 
independence, and seemingly in contradiction with the party’s geopolitical and ideological 
position that could have been inclined towards nationalization of the sector, MPLA set up a 
committee to secure that existing international partnerships remained operative, and 
masterminded the transfer of the Portuguese-owned oil company, Angol, to the new 
independent state. The committee convinced part of the Portuguese staff to remain and 
combined diplomacy and pressure on Gulf Oil (now Chevron) to deal with the new 
government. By the end of 1976, Angola had returned to pre-independence production levels 
and the credibility of the committee, which later that year was rebranded as state-owned 
Sonangol––Sociedade Nacional de Combustíveis––Angola’s national oil company, convinced 
other partner IOCs to remain on board (Soares de Oliveira 2007a; Heller 2012).  
MPLA gave Sonangol complete leeway on sector strategy because of the imminence of war 
and the significance of the oil rent. Similarly, the committee’s appointees were skilled and 
experienced but with proven loyalty to MPLA and direct connections to the higher echelons 
of the party. Sonangol’s productivity-enhancing corporate structure was predicated on the 
alignment of interests of the sectors represented and benefitted by Sonangol and the 
Presidential military and business entourage. MPLA concentrated its scarce executive 
capacity into Sonangol, spurred by war and the sheer need of the revenue. In marked contrast 
to the experience of fragmented NOCs elsewhere, President Neto and the party wisely 
refrained from interfering in technical decisions and kept Sonangol protected from 
patrimonial politics, so long as the company guaranteed stable revenue to wage the war 
(Soares de Oliveira 2007a).  
This was possible for an array of reasons. In the immediate post-independence the MPLA 
that took power was cohesive in the sense that it represented the aspirations of a mostly urban 
sector. In a way, MPLA could not claim national or broad social representation. But on the 
other hand, the war meant that MPLA faced armed rather than political opposition: single 
party status allowed MPLA to avoid the need to negotiate policy-making for decades. In their 
comparative examination of national oil companies, Thurber et al. (2011) identify three key 
factors that explain MPLA’s willingness to foster and protect efficiency and capacity in 
Sonangol: this low level of internal political competition (cf. Nigeria); the urgency to fund 
the war effort; and in the long run, the longer time horizon allowed by the almost uncontested 
and very long tenure of dos Santos in the presidency as well as his ability to use oil rents to 
cement regime durability. 
Over the years Sonangol designed, implemented and optimized a long-term development 
strategy that resulted, in a short span, in the transformation of a geological advantage into 
corporate capacity. During the early 1980s, Sonangol negotiated majority stakes on 
concessions; actively promoted corporate and individual skills-acquisition through an array of 
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agreements with consultants and foreign NOCs and enforced local content progressively, 
continuously revising demands upwards to leverage its bargaining position resulting from the 
combination of large deposits, high oil prices and the company’s good reputation in the sector 
(Victor et al. 2011).  
During the war Angola offered to compensate international operators for heightened risk and 
potential political instability with credible and efficient management of the sector, as opposed 
to offering royalty or tax discounts.13 Sonangol was particularly adept in adapting the 
institutional arrangement for its own advantage. The evolution of contracts is a good example 
of the way Angola secured revenue streams in a productive manner. Original tax and royalty 
contracts in the 1980s in which Sonangol received dividends on the oil sales as majority 
partner were replaced in the mid-2000s with production sharing agreements (PSAs) in which 
Sonangol’s participation was more limited, but in which the compensation was received in 
oil, allowing Sonangol to directly commercialize it. Furthermore, shares are calculated 
according to a progressive formula based on rates-of-return that maximizes Sonangol’s share 
as profits rise. Sonangol is actively involved in designing exploration and production projects 
and, by having the last word on costs approved and leverage to push for more profitable 
solutions, it manages to maximize the state’s take.14 Additionally, concession partners pay 
treasury a 20 per cent oil transaction tax on the sale of their share of oil, as does Sonangol. 
All these factors combined make the Angolan oil revenue regime one of the most effective 
existing systems in securing a larger share of oil revenue for the state among countries open 
to foreign investment at operator level (i.e., besides ‘service contracts’ to national oil 
companies found in most Persian Gulf countries). State-owned Sonangol has become a 
competitive operator in its own right, and through partnerships and local content provisions a 
national private oil sector has emerged (Heller 2012). Throughout the period Sonangol 
proved to operate with a long time horizon, less animated by commercial imperatives (i.e., 
extracting as much revenue, as fast as possible) than by a management strategy that 
maximized the state’s take and prolonged the commercial operation of the fields.  
Despite this impressive trajectory, Angola struggles to translate high oil rents into improved 
socioeconomic prospects for a large part of the population. Similarly, although significant 
advances have been made in bringing the rents more fully into the budget cycle and more 
recently launching a sovereign wealth fund, instances of delays in rent transfers from 
Sonangol to the budget, blurred accounting and reports of misappropriation persist.  
Although such failures could have caused the demise of the MPLA, economic and political 
reasons converge to explain this regime’s durability. The rent management architecture in 
Angola is designed to reinforce the stability of the regime. Local content provisions in the oil 
sector as well as an array of other non-oil service provision contracts are leveraged to reward 
companies owned by groups and individuals with links to the regime, leading to domestic 
accumulation by empowering allies, co-opting potential contenders and marginalizing 
opponents. A result of this is the emergence of a sector of domestic private companies of 
                                                
13  These risks were limited due to the offshore location of oil fields, but also due to the political and military 
position of the warring parties: FLEC had limited capacity while UNITA was careful to avoid up-setting the US 
oil company and US government when it had the opportunity of striking key infrastructure, see CTC (1993). 
14 Sonangol’s share of profit oil in PSAs starts at 20 per cent when rate of return is lower than 25 per cent and 
goes up to 90 per cent if rates of return exceed 40 per cent (Heller 2012; PwC 2013). 
 14 
uneven capacity which take part in exploration and production joint ventures or provide 
supplies and ancillary services mainly to the oil and gas sector (Heller 2012; Ovadia 2012).  
Observers of the oil sector agree that the short-listing of national partners and service 
contractors, steered by Sonangol, is the main channel for distribution of rents originating in 
the sector. Key figures in the presidential entourage have stakes in such companies (Ovadia 
2012; Burgis 2012a, 2012b). It is difficult to ascertain to what extent rent distribution thwarts 
the socialization of oil revenue in a more developmental manner, as oil taxes and revenues 
are the backbone of state revenue and funding of the general budget. However, it is 
noteworthy that Angola’s system of patronage has not been predatory or incompatible with 
the emergence of an efficient and productive sector, which has been the case in other oil-
producing countries. 
Furthermore, also the political process cemented regime resilience: As one of three 
competing national independence parties born in the 1950-60s, the MPLA distinguished itself 
by its urban roots in Luanda and cross-ethnic constituents including a large number of 
mestiços. This basis, together with a closer affinity to the post-Caetano Portuguese (Marxist 
military) regime and the backing of Cuban military ensured its dominance in Angolan politics 
from 1975 onwards. Rarely challenged internally, with the exception of the failed 1977 coup 
attempt led by hard-liner Nito Alves, the regime evolved from a one-party socialist regime 
into a pragmatic, incrementalist and highly-centralized regime controlled by the president––
Eduardo dos Santos after the death of Agostinho Neto in 1979––and its key advisers (the 
‘Futungistas’) (Chabal and Vidal 2008). Some forms of dissent do occur within the party, but 
are rarely public or directly affect the party’s grip on the state. State power rests on highly 
centralized and personalized patronage system ensuring that access to political seats, official 
functions and the largest business opportunities rest within the remit of presidential approval 
(Vines and Weimer 2011b).15 
As the ruling party after independence, MPLA found it difficult to assert its legitimacy 
among the whole population and to extend its authority throughout the entire territory, 
notably because a large proportion of the population and vast parts of the country remained 
controlled by UNITA throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Since 2002 the Angolan regime has 
moved on from the challenges of survival based on military strength and petroleum revenues. 
The Angolan state now exerts its authority over its entire territory, though with centralized 
political control, MPLA legitimacy and resource extraction in mind, rather than public 
service delivery and social contract ethos, doing so in a direct fashion through the presidential 
nomination of provincial governors and a ‘dizzying array of post-war strategies ranging from 
high-modernist, pseudo-developmental state activism to extensive subcontracting to non-state 
actors that are used to expand the writ of the state from the political centre and provincial 
capitals to the remotest regions’ (Soares de Oliveira 2013: 165). Externally the Angolan state 
has been very proactive, but its influence remains largely shaped by these military and 
petroleum dimensions (Le Billon et al. 2008; Vines and Weimer 2009). The MPLA was able 
to survive and come out of the challenging years of the 1990s as a prosperous and 
                                                
15 Patronage strategies in Angola have notably included: presidential nomination of all senior civil servants; 
allocation of housing; perks to ‘intellectuals’ (journalists, professionals, technicians) via the Comités do Partido 
de Especialidade; benefits through imposed local partnering and staff hiring on foreign companies. With now 
about six million registered members, or nearly every adult Angolan, MPLA membership is perceived as a 
‘must’, while extended family connections play both entitlement and disciplining roles. 
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unchallenged ruling party, whose official legitimacy was boosted through two rounds of 
elections, in 2008 and to a lesser extent in 2012. The strength of the Angolan state, however, 
remains (precariously) based in the centralized control and limited handouts of a party-state, 
rather than on the legitimacy of inclusive governance or the effectiveness of a developmental 
state. 
3.2 Mozambique: aid dependency and mega-projects 
After mediated peace negotiations ended a devastating civil war, Mozambique faced a 
different peace-building challenge with a transition to multiparty democracy fraught with 
tensions. Third-party mediation was central to protecting Mozambique’s fragile peace, 
particularly in light of Angola’s relapse into war following the failure of the 1991 Bicesse 
peace accords. Since independence Frelimo had cultivated good diplomatic relations with 
some western countries and in the mid-1980s, as it began embracing market liberalization, 
relations with the United States were re-established––a decade earlier than Angola. Italy, 
especially through the Catholic community of Sant’Egidio, was a critical facilitator of the 
dialogues that led to the GPA. According to Manning and Malbrough (2010), donors were 
well versed in Mozambican politics and humanitarian challenges and keen to engage in the 
peace-building effort despite their diverse political agendas. The United Nations, multilateral 
agencies and bilateral donors effectively used positive and negative inducements to support 
the peace-building effort. 
At critical points of the post-conflict transition to a multiparty democracy, the coordinated 
action of donors activated the necessary lever to keep both parties in the game, pushing 
through stalled legislative debates and providing guarantees in the 1994 presidential elections 
which Renamo’s leader Afonso Dhlakama threatened to boycott. Of these incentives, the 
most influential was the creation by the UN and bilateral donors of two trust funds to support 
the emergence of opposition parties. Under this programme 17 emerging parties received 
US$150,000 each, with Renamo receiving at its peak a monthly stipend of US$300,000 
(Manning and Malbrough 2010).  
This coordinated intervention had two effects: it reassured donors that they were on the right 
track, giving way to portrayals of Mozambique as a case of aid effectiveness, which in turn 
legitimized foreign missions in the eyes of their superiors and national constituencies. On the 
other hand, by having the donor community intervene to solve political deadlocks, 
international mediation progressively became institutionalized in Mozambican politics, while 
Renamo and Frelimo found it hard to use democratic mechanisms and build mutual trust, as 
demonstrated in recent deadly skirmishes occurring in the midst of difficult negotiations over 
electoral processes and access to resource rents (England 2013a). 
The decade following the 1994 elections was a period of accommodation in which Frelimo 
officials learned to navigate donor relations while complying with the agenda of structural 
adjustment. The emphasis of the first decade of development assistance was on the 
consolidation of democratic mechanisms. Support was given to the state at the national level. 
Donor disenchantment with the political system led in the second decade to a greater 
emphasis on decentralizing aid disbursements and advancing governance as opposed to the 
first decade’s accent on strengthening democratic participation (Manning and Malbrough 
2012). Throughout the period donors have channelled up to 40 per cent of their contribution 
through budget support, though assistance was conditioned to a continuous and demanding 
cycle of planning and performance evaluation by donors (De Renzio and Hanlon 2007).  
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Mozambique became one of the largest recipients of ODA by western donors and qualified 
for debt relief through the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries and the Multilateral Debt Relief 
Initiatives. Mozambique’s aid dependence has led some critics to initially fear a 
‘recolonization’ of the country (Plank 1993). In the two decades since the end of the conflict 
most of the key policy discussions in Mozambique have been influenced by donors, with 
some examples of the Mozambican government successfully resisting some policy proposals, 
such as blanket land privatization. Still, donor inflexibility on policy prescriptions coupled 
with the lack of political will on the part of Frelimo to rethink the rent management strategy 
and the consolidation of domestic business interests linked to the extractives industry and 
capable of resisting reforms to increase government take on the sector could be taking a toll 
on the resilience of the post-war settlement (Africa Confidential 2013b, CIP 2013a).  
General budget support aimed at reconciling donor and national agendas in the framework of 
the budget and PRSP cycles. By pooling donor funds it was expected that there would be a 
reduction in the time officials spent addressing ODA-related requirements. But budget 
support did not reduce bureaucratic overload in Mozambique and observers have noted that 
with donors becoming the main counterpart of negotiations with the state, a weakening of 
domestic mechanisms of oversight and participation was left unaddressed (De Renzio and 
Hanlon 2007; Manning and Malbrough 2012). Furthermore, as Manning and Malbrough 
(2012) observe: ‘the unintended consequence of strengthening state capacity, has been to 
strengthen the ruling party’s grip on the state’, this was the result of the state increasingly 
functioning on the basis of foreign assistance funds and Frelimo turning social provision and 
public employment into mechanisms to strengthen the party (Sumich 2010).  
As described above, state revenue in Mozambique in the past two decades has been mainly 
supported through aid inflows, and not resource rents. However since the mid-2000s 
Mozambique became the focus of interest from investors eager to explore and exploit its 
abundant natural resources. Electricity generation was already at the core of the colonial 
economy and at the time of independence there was awareness of the existence of coal 
deposits. Yet at the end of the Mozambican war in 1992 the prospects for growth and 
investment were not promising and it was only in the mid-2000s that systematic exploration 
resulted in the discovery of vast deposits of coking coal and offshore natural gas that are 
currently at the centre of the country’s extractives boom.16 The low percentage of state 
revenue originating from natural resources, however, is not only due to the late discovery of 
the most sizeable deposits and the slow pace of commercial development and revenue 
generation. Mozambique has been host to a set of mega-projects exploiting the country’s 
endowments (electricity, heavy sands) since the late 1990s, but the post-conflict fiscal regime 
was not designed to boost revenue collection from the productive activities in the economy, 
but on the contrary, to provide fiscal incentives to attract investment (Bolnick 2009; 
Cunguara 2012). Although the 2002 investment code was replaced in 2007 with a new code 
of fiscal benefits which improved the rate of taxation, the Mozambican state still provides 
ample incentives in contracts negotiated on a case-by-case basis and taxation and royalty 
rates remain low in comparative terms despite legislative reforms currently being 
discussed.17  
                                                
16 Offshore gas reserves in the Rovuma Basin are estimated at 124 tcf (CIP 2013b). 
17  For details on the expected timing of LNG-related revenue, see CIP (2013b) and (2013c). 
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The first Investment Law approved in 1993 created an exceptional regime for corporate 
taxation and a 1998 ruling introduced new incentives to set up industrial processing zones. 
The fiscal incentives regime thus was consolidated in a period in which multilateral 
institutions advocated strongly for privatization in natural resources (Bridge 2004). The 
resulting regime for investors willing to set up industrial processing zones reduced corporate 
income tax from the 32 per cent rate in the regular regime to a 1 per cent flat rate and 
exempted the approved projects from paying royalties, VAT, customs duties and property 
transfer taxes.   
A handful of projects benefitted from this regime in the late 1990s: among them the industrial 
parks linked to two heavy sand projects and Mozal, the aluminium smelter part-owned by 
BHP Billiton, Mitsubishi Corp., the South African Industrial Development Corporation and 
with a minority stake by the government of Mozambique. Kenmare’s deal included clauses 
extending the tax exemptions for 20 years, and 50 years and renewable extension in the case 
of Mozal. Both included stability clauses and a standing guarantee by the Multilateral 
Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) to protect against breach (and renegotiation) of 
contract (Kuegler 2008).  
Mozal is the best-studied case because it was the first and largest project approved––it had an 
initial investment of US$2.2 billion––and received the most generous incentives. In many 
respects it is an outlier, but it is a relevant case for study because it reveals the expectations 
and ideologies that underpinned contract negotiation in the postwar period. On top of the 
fiscal exemptions, the government committed to facilitating the repatriation of profits. Mozal 
also benefits from an attractive price for electricity it buys from ESKOM.18 The imports 
custom exemption was an important element of the deal because Mozal’s alumina inputs are 
wholly imported. From inception, Mozal went on to become Mozambique’s largest company, 
with an estimated 6 per cent contribution to GDP by 2006 and accounting for 40 per cent of 
total exports in 2012 (Sonne-Schmidt et al. 2009). However, with inputs that are imported 
duty-free, profit repatriation, a minimum demand for local goods and services and only 1,910 
workers by 2009 (KPMG 2011), Mozal is an example of the difficulties that arise in 
establishing productive linkages between capital-intensive extractive projects and the broader 
economy. It is estimated that from the US$1.2 billion revenue posted per year, only US$200 
million actually enter the Mozambican economy. In fiscal terms, despite revenues of 
US$1,204 million and net profits of US$414 million in 2006, due to the contractual 
arrangement the company paid a mere US$12 million in taxes corresponding to that same 
year. According to Kuegler’s estimations (2008), the foregone revenue, estimated on the 
basis of the Mozal’s fees in the regular regime, was US$120 million, equivalent to 124 per 
cent of the total income tax collected by the state on that year. Furthermore, it has been 
estimated that although 3.4 per cent of the profits accrue to Mozambique as shareholder in the 
project, half of this goes to repay the loan with the European Investment Bank with which the 
shares were bought (Jubilee Debt Campaign 2012).  
                                                
18 South African ESKOM, a buyer of electricity generated in Mozambique’s Cahora Bassa dam, provides 
Mozal with electricity, at a fix rate of 1.1 cents per kWh in 2000-06 and 1.6 cents in 2006-12 in contrast with 
4.5 cents for industrial users and 9 cents for domestic users in Mozambique. Also cf. with 2.34 for industrial 
users in South Africa. It is estimated that Mozal uses 45 per cent of the electrivity produced and 65 per cent of 
the electricity consumed in Mozambique (Jubilee Debt Campaign 2012; Bucuane and Mulder 2009). 
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The projects approved after the introduction of the 2002 code included, for example, the 
hydro-power dam of Mpanda Nkuwa, the coalmines of Rio Tinto and Vale in Moatize and 
more recently the offshore natural gas blocks of the Rovuma basin in concession to Anadarko, 
Statoil and ENI. Contracts of this generation no longer benefit from the 1 per cent corporate 
income tax, but most have a 25 per cent reduction on the regular rate. Exemptions on VAT and 
import duties for machinery also apply. Production tax rates for gas go from 2 per cent to 5 per 
cent and for oil from 3 per cent to 8 per cent depending on the depth of the reservoir of origin. 
Coal has 3 per cent production tax at FOB prices minus transport costs (Nuvunga 2013). Draft 
versions of all-encompassing petroleum and mining law are under public consultation at the 
time of writing. The new regime would bring Mozambique closer to the Angolan model by 
introducing a similar tax scale for shared production in oil and gas and profit taxes of 40 per 
cent in mining. Production tax rates would increase for oil to 10 per cent, for gas to 6 per cent 
and for coal to 5 per cent (República de Moçambique 2013a, 2013b). 
As a result of an investment strategy that has historically relied on fiscal incentives and 
charged relatively low production taxes, for years Mozambique had low level of tax revenue 
as a share of GDP. The low fiscal base constrained the capacity and the autonomy of the state 
and reinforced aid-dependency, confirming the hypothesis that links aid dependence and low 
tax revenue. Between 1993 and 1999 tax revenue represented 11.4 per cent of GDP and only 
after considerable reform reached 14.4 per cent in 2006 (Bolnick 2009). As the economy 
expands, revenue collection has increased. OECD calculates that revenue as percentage of 
GDP reached 15.6 per cent in 2009 and 19.4 per cent in 2012 (OECD 2013b). Tax revenue 
from the extractive sector amounts to a mere 5 per cent of GDP, but is set to grow in a decade 
or so as more extractive projects come fully online. The expansion of the taxbase intends to 
compensate for the decreasing proportional participation of ODA in funding the general 
budget, but it remains to see whether it will be sufficient. ODA contributed to financing 40 
per cent of the 2012 budget and is estimated that it will decrease to 32.8 per cent in 2013. 
With a smaller but more varied taxbase, in 2010 Mozambique’s revenues from taxes19 
amounted to US$1.7 billion and revenues from extractives to US$33 million (OECD 2013a, 
2013b).  
In contrast, the bulk of Angola’s fiscal base originates in revenues from extractives (US$21.4 
billion in 2010) rather than taxation (12.3 billion in 2010). This is increasingly so, as 
production-sharing agreements provide more revenue to the state in the form of direct profits 
than tax payments. Both the comparatively larger size of the Angolan economy and its 
considerable non-oil deficit translate into lower revenues from taxation as percentage of total 
GDP, but in absolute terms the revenues from taxes estimated in US$12.3 billion in 2010, far 
exceed Mozambique’s US$1.7 billion (OECD 2013b). When comparing Angola and 
Mozambique in terms of the extent to which the tax regimes express the nature of the existing 
political settlement, Angola is a case of oil-related resources preventing the state from having 
to tax domestic interest groups, which is a mechanism that in the Mozambican case seems to 
have been activated by the availability of ODA (Di John 2010). In both cases this relaxation 
allowed unchecked accumulation by domestic elites, but in the Angolan case this appears to 
have been more fully controlled by the state, bolstering power centralization.   
4 Comparing outcomes in light of past trajectories 
                                                
19 Includes direct, indirect and trade taxes. 
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Mozambique and Angola share historical characteristics and feature an array of 
commonalities to this day. However, post-war state-building and reconstruction processes in 
the two countries relied on different sources of finance, giving way to the emergence of 
different institutional responses. Each country’s particular political economy interacting with 
the conditions created by their different source of finance have combined to result in different 
state quality outcomes. This section zooms in on the comparative analysis and postulates the 
mechanisms and processes that have set the two countries on divergent paths.  
The closer relationship of Mozambique with western donors has geopolitical roots in war-
time cooperation and lending aided by Frelimo’s more effective diplomacy (Manning and 
Malbrough 2010, 2012). In contrast, MPLA financed the war with expensive and secretive 
oil-backed loans from public and private institutions from Brazil, Spain and Portugal (de 
Oliveira 2011; Shaxson 2007b). The availability of the oil rent as collateral and the reluctance 
of MPLA to open their accounts to IFI scrutiny meant that faced with a similar challenge of 
renegotiating debt to re-join the international financial system, Angola and Mozambique 
parted ways. Mozambique welcomed IMF-led structural adjustment as a condition for further 
lending and opened its doors to a variety of bilateral donors. Failed negotiations with the IMF 
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Figure 4: Angola and Mozambique ODA by main DAC donors 
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Source: OECD-DAC (2013).20   
prevented Angola from entering a similar structural adjustment programme and led donors to 
engage more marginally. Not only did Angola receive roughly a tenth of what Mozambique 
received in ODA inflows, but whereas donors prioritized engagement with the government 
and budget support in the past decade in Mozambique, in Angola most of the resources went 
to projects and were implemented through NGOs and CSOs. 
The timing of the end of the conflict must also be factored in. While the international 
community’s enthusiasm for liberalization, privatization and rolling back the state was at its 
height in 1992, when the Mozambican conflict came to an end, by the time the conflict ended 
in Angola a decade later it had somewhat waned. Sustaining the peace agreement in 
Mozambique demanded substantial intermediation and incentives from donors interested in 
accelerating the democratic transition. Presidential elections took place only two years later 
in 1994. MPLA’s military victory over UNITA in 2002 left the opposition weakened, giving 
MPLA ample space to consolidate. With less international pressure and funds pushing for 
democratic consolidation, the first post-conflict presidential elections came only in 2008. 
Mozambique, as an early example of liberal peace-building, adopted political institutions 
with less capacity to direct the economy, whereas the Angolan state, in a process that remains 
highly undemocratic (Soares de Oliveira 2011), retained a greater degree of command and 
capacity for intervention. 
Similarly, whereas both political systems reflect an alliance between the ruling party and 
private capital in the hands of a well-connected oligarchy, Heller (2012) and Thurber et al. 
(2011) identify embedded mechanisms pushing for higher levels of performance and 
competiveness at least in the domestic public and private oil sector in Angola. In contrast, 
Mozambique does not yet have a strong national gas or mining company––public or private, 
and the advice offered by IFIs and some CSOs alike is to keep the state at bay.21 Empresa 
Nacional de Hidrocarbonetos, the closest there is to a NOC, advances timidly; a public sector 
                                                
20 Datum for Portugal to Angola, 2004, not included in the average as it reflects a debt-restructuring deal 
outside the Paris Club (See IMF ‘Angola: 2004 Article IV Consultation, Staff Report). 
21  CIP considers national ownership in the extractive industry risky and based on symbolic rather than financial 
arguments. The IMF advocates for the participation of the state to be kept modest (CIP 2013c, IMF 2013). 
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outlet manages state shares in mining and O&G and Mineral Resource and Energy Ministry, 
though growing in capacity is still no match for the world’s largest mining TNCs operating in 
Mozambique.  
Box 2: Comparing ODA inflows to Angola and Mozambique  
Looking beyond the differences in magnitude of aid inflows into Angola and Mozambique, important 
observations arise from a descriptive analysis of the origins of the funds and the way they had been 
allocated into different sectors. At the time of the peace agreement Mozambique had a varied and 
balanced pool of bilateral donors. Over the years, however, funding by the United States and the United 
Kingdom have continued growing whereas funding by other donors has grown less rapidly. Italy’s 
substantial contribution at the time of the negotiations has been falling, whereas the contribution of the 
group of countries that have been supporting Mozambique since independence, notably the Nordic 
countries, has in broad terms remained stable. Contributions to Angola were far more limited in the period 
studied. The United State has been the main post-war donor.  
In terms of distributional decisions about allocation, the later end of the conflict in Angola translated into a 
humanitarian expenditure dominating assistance to Angola and remaining the single largest destination of 
funds until 2005 after a peak of US$197 million in 2003. Thereafter the composition of expenditure 
changes and programme assistance, mainly channelled through NGOs and CSOs takes the lead. In 
marked contrast with Mozambique, social expenditure does not figure as a main destination during any 
period, although assistance to the health sector stands out for receiving more funds, likely in line with 
regional programmatic priorities in the combat against HIV. Funds for infrastructure fall sharply after 2004 
when Angola started implementing road and construction projects with Chinese credit lines. Aid inflows to 
Mozambique have been increasingly dominated by the expansion of the budget support programme, 
which features under programme assistance and far surpasses funds allocated to any other sector. A 
comparison of funds allocated to direct social provision provides an idea of the extent to which core social 
sectors of health, education, water and sanitation have for years relied in Mozambique on donor’s 
contribution, whereas in Angola are only marginally part of the aid portfolio.  
Source: The authors, based on OECD-DAC data. 
 
Prospectibility and type of commodity 
The degree of certainty about the size and quality of the deposits and the specific type of 
commodity exploited adds another layer of differentiation, but the defining element here is 
the institutional arrangement, the operative limitations and the way both combine with each 
country’s political settlement, rather than the commodity per se. 
Oil, gas and coal are not readily comparable, but discounting the specific geological 
challenges of different reservoirs and taking into account the demands of project development 
and the characteristics of each global market it could be postulated that oil, being easier to 
produce than gas, is also a commodity that offers more possibilities for states to contrive for 
themselves an active role in the sector. In essence, Angola has developed and efficient NOC 
aided in part by its wealth in exploitable and simpler to commercialize oil. However, the 
comparison with other oil-producing countries with less performing oil sectors underscores 
the fact that if this geological advantage may facilitate acquiring local capacity, it is certainly 
not a sufficient condition.  
Most of the national oil companies emerged with force in response to nationalist ideologies 
gaining strength in oil-producing countries but also as a means to close the information and 
monitoring deficit in the relation between producers and local states and, although with less 
cases of success, as a mechanism to boost backward and forward linkages integrated to a 
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broader industrialization strategy (Victor et al. 2011). Unlike oil, which can be sold at the 
wellhead, gas can only be commercially exported over long distances compressed in the form 
of liquefied natural gas (LNG).  
The development of LNG projects is more capital intensive than oil and gas pipelines. This 
extends the projects’ time horizons and sensibly increases their financial complexity. The 
financial adaptation is the commercialization through future delivery contracts signed with 
global utility companies at projected prices. Developing the type of direct commercialization 
by oil-based Sonangol would be more difficult for gas-heavy Mozambique. 
It has been postulated therefore that LNG is more sensitive than oil to political volatility and 
that the core determinants of the future development of the global gas market are political and 
institutional. On the other hand, unlike oil, LNG requires that most of the capital investment 
be made where deposits are located (Victor et al. 2006).  
Coal production also presents important challenges in terms of the logistics and infrastructure 
of transporting produce to port. In the case of Mozambique this is compounded by the 
requirement to build dedicated transport solutions and by the physical location of deposits 
and transport links in the hinterland of central Mozambique, one of the epicentres of the civil 
war and the stronghold of different forms of political opposition. Indeed, the prospects of the 
sector have lost some steam since concessionaries became more sober about the costs and 
hurdles to coal transportation (England 2013b). Additionally the options available to states in 
terms of designing their role in the sector are constrained by current trends towards 
accelerated global corporate consolidation. Strong competition and the array of variables 
involved in developing a coal mining project mean that competitive advantage is secured by 
corporations that can leverage economies of scale to force down production costs and 
command a portfolio of diversified assets. This explains why coal super-majors are not 
devoted exclusively to coal production. Consequently, successful examples of industrial 
policy applied to the development of indigenous coal corporations have been contingent on 
scale and direct access to markets (Nolan and Rui 2006).  
Fiscal base, trajectory and prospects 
Our examination of the fiscal architecture in both countries finds Angola deriving revenue 
both through taxes and profits, imposing higher production taxes on IOCs and pushing for 
Angolanização, a more stringent local beneficiation and skills acquisition regime. On the 
back of this strategy, the Angolan NOC has acquired global standing and oil rents have 
funded the state, despite legitimate doubts about the capacity and willingness of the regime to 
transfer capacity to non-oil private and public sectors.  
Mozambique’s endowments will take years to fully come online, but the country struggles to 
break with a post-conflict investment regime that granted corporations excessive incentives 
and eroded the taxbase. Tellingly while straight out of war Angola managed to impose 
majority stake in most oil concessions, Mozambique’s profits from its minority stake in 
Mozal still are mostly destined to repaying the loan with which the shares were acquired 
(Jubilee Debt Campaign 2012). The compared trajectory seems to disprove the alleged 
benefits of fiscal incentives. Corporate tax rate in Angola is 35 per cent, but 50 per cent in the 
oil sector. Profit taxes depend on a sliding scale but can go from 20 per cent to 90 per cent. 
Corporate income tax rates in Mozambique are 32 per cent but companies with contracts 
negotiated before the introduction of the 2002 investment code pay a 1 per cent rate. 
Although the 2007 code rebalances a system that was unduly skewed in favour of large-scale 
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capital-intensive projects and the treasury has implemented new ways to boost tax collection, 
it is now widely accepted that the regime of fiscal exemptions reinforced the historical pattern 
of accumulation based on an extractive economy with a weak productive base (Castel-Branco 
2010). Some fear that mega-projects could deplete non-renewable resources before their 
contribution to development materializes (Nuvunga 2013).  
Figure 5: Government revenue per capita 
 
 
 
 
Per capita government revenues decupled, or tripled in constant terms, in Angola over the 
past two decades, reaching US$2,500 per person in 2011, twenty times the amount available 
for the Mozambican government (see Figure 5). Though reduced on a power purchasing 
parity basis, this sharp contrast entails major differences in opportunities to consolidate the 
authority and effectiveness of the Angolan state as compared to that in Mozambique, while 
their source––mostly oil rents––provides much autonomy over their use by the Angolan 
government. If the Angolan government has seized this opportunity to consolidate its 
authority, it has not yet demonstrated its effectiveness in delivering public services and 
broadly shared development outcomes (Soares de Oliveira 2013). Angola’s strategy is heavy 
on infrastructural investment and can be credited with some improvement in terms of welfare 
indicators. However such improvements remain slow and insufficient both in relation to the 
needs and to the potential resource mobilization, while on the other hand proving at times 
hostile to certain groups of the population, for instance with forced evictions of ‘informal’ 
urban dwellers (Unruh 2012). 
We have described the way in which oil rents in Angola and aid-funded budget support in 
Mozambique helped provide durability to both states by unwittingly strengthening the ruling 
party. The different level of state-robustness however is linked to greater rent 
manoeuvrability and centralization in Angola as opposed to a more fluid political landscape 
and more fragmented sources of economic power in Mozambique. Regardless of the origin of 
revenues, the centralized institutional arrangement that manages the oil rent in Angola is a 
good match for centralized political regime with scarce and concentrated technical capacity, 
as Thurber et al. (2011) observe in their comparison of Angola and other oil-producing 
countries. It may be the case that the institutional design in Mozambique is not attuned to the 
economic foundations of the state, with its limited fiscal base and, until recently, extreme 
dependence on external funding.  
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Both in Mozambique and in Angola ruling parties retained power and further consolidated it 
after the end of the war. In both cases this took the form of blurring the line between party 
and state and using the state apparatus to garner support at different levels. In both cases 
traditional opposition parties have lost steam and new credible opposition parties have 
emerged. Tensions between Frelimo and Renamo have scaled up over the last year, with the 
latter threatening to boycott the municipal elections and instigating armed violence in the 
central provinces. But the consolidation of the ruling parties had a different character in each 
case. The process that allowed for the concentration of power in the group around President 
dos Santos in Angola created a vertical and fairly monolithic structure characterized by an 
efficient and autonomous management of the oil rent. 
In Mozambique, the more fragmented rents have led to the emergence of a constellation of 
groups with representation in Frelimo that have consolidated their business interests as 
shareholders and local partners for foreign investors. These sectors wield considerable 
political power and autonomy from a single source of authority within the party (Africa 
Confidential 2011, 2013a). Although ODA inflows turned into social provision were used to 
buy-in support for the government, aid, as a type of revenue, is not domestically controlled. 
Growing reliance on taxes collected in the extractive sector could give the Mozambican state 
a firmer basis for launching a development strategy more in line with the country’s political 
economy, but it remains to be seen if the more multi-polar Frelimo, made up of interest 
groups which already derive power from their position as local partners in joint ventures and 
concessions, has the strength and the motivation to renegotiate national resource contracts in 
order to maximize state revenue. 
To sum up, Angola and Mozambique are both dominated by ruling parties that have 
consolidated through partidarização, the ‘partization’ of the state apparatus through which 
public sector funds and employment are used to strengthen the ruling party, opposition is 
openly and covertly discouraged, and elections serve to legitimize the incumbent party.22 Yet 
the foundations of ruling party consolidation differ in Angola and Mozambique: whereas the 
political process in Angola led to the emergence of a solid patronage system with President 
dos Santos firmly positioned at the top, the undisputed dominance of Frelimo in Mozambique 
is less personalized even if the system also concentrates functions and power in the executive. 
Some observers postulate growing fractiousness among the ranks (Sumich 2010).  
A comparative examination of the political economy process provides part of the explanation 
for such divergence. Able to secure continuous oil revenues, the MPLA was effective at 
channelling resources first to fund the war effort and then maintain power centralization 
through the redistribution of fast rising resource rents and the pursuit of a ‘modernist’ 
development vision. In contrast, Frelimo did not benefit from such source of funding: the 
basis of the Mozambican colonial economy––e.g., power generation from the Cahora Bassa 
dam and transport corridors to hinterland countries- was heavily disrupted and sabotaged by 
Renamo and the Apartheid regime. Relying on international aid and thus ‘adopting’ 
liberalization’s precepts, Mozambique saw the consolidation of an accumulating yet 
internally competing elite benefiting from across-the-board privatization and lax taxation. 
Massive resource development opportunities are now calling for the reformulation of the 
investment and fiscal framework, but vested interests seem well positioned to prevent it and 
leave the state aid-dependent. 
                                                
22 As in other African polities and beyond, see Amundsen (2011). 
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5 Conclusion 
This comparative analysis of relative fragility of the Mozambican and Angolan states 
challenges the dominant narrative of post-war Mozambique as a ‘success story’ for the 
international donor community, one that resulted in the state being more ‘robust’ than in 
Angola, itself portrayed as a fragile petro-state. While many socioeconomic and governance 
indicators confirm this dominant narrative, we have stressed the durability of the Angolan 
regime; its purposeful acquisition of productive capacity in the oil sector; some of the rapid 
changes associated with the conjuncture of its particularly autonomous political trajectory 
and the decade-old context of military victory over UNITA. As we have discussed, foreign 
development actors’ role in Angola is more geared towards technical assistance and 
cooperation than towards financial assistance in the form of budget support, given the 
relatively minor importance of ODA funds to Angola’s budgets. This sharply contrasts with 
Mozambique where both technical and financial assistance are closely tied.  
Strong oil revenues and access to diverse sources of (oil-backed) finance have resulted in a 
higher degree of autonomy and self-confidence for the Angolan state. Reinforced by a vast 
security apparatus, undisputed authority resulting from its military victory over UNITA and 
historical dividend of having been the leading independence party, the MPLA-led Angolan 
state can be described as robust from a durability and authority perspective. Furthermore, 
some signs of a peace dividend and a large propaganda machine attempted to enhance the 
popularity of the ruling party. Several factors, however, severely test this apparent robustness, 
including an aging ruler controlling a highly centralized neopatrimonial regime, the frustrated 
aspirations of the urban youth, and a combination of oil dependence, stagnant economic 
diversification, and rising indebtedness. Donors may have a limited risk in helping the 
government -and Angolan society more generally- address some of these risks, notably by 
prioritizing diversification, productive upgrading and industrialization and by encouraging 
inclusive social political reforms.  
Whereas the Angolan state managed to remain highly centralized through an autonomous 
liberalization process, enabled in part by the dominance of oil revenues in the economy, the 
state in Mozambique remained cohesive yet more decentralized and fragmented through a 
donor-driven liberalization process that resulted in aid dependence. While Mozambique was 
long considered ‘resource poor’ and highly aid dependent, it now has some opportunity to 
gain in authority and effectiveness through capitalizing on major extractive projects.23 Yet 
we suggest that a context of aid dependence and fiscal incentives seems to have resulted in 
low share of resource revenue captured by the Mozambican state and the entrenchment of 
powerful domestic groups that are not interested or compelled to renegotiate contracts, 
expand the fiscal base or strengthen the state’s direct intervention. Though this would require 
further investigation, we note that this keeps the social provision dangerously dependent on 
continued donor support and could more generally undermine state authority, legitimacy and 
effectiveness, leaving the state more vulnerable to challenges by old and new opposition 
forces and the broader population. One implication for donors is to assist the Mozambican 
government in increasing resource revenues by reformulating the fiscal framework and 
renegotiating current contracts, while seeking to ensure that additional revenues translate into 
effective developmental outcomes  and do not increase the fragility of the state. 
                                                
23 This, of course, does not begin to address the problems, also latent in Angola, of a disbalanced economic 
base failing to diversify away from extractives. See specially Castel-Branco (2010). 
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